Utah v. Alvie Grover : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Utah v. Alvie Grover : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey T. Colemere; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; W. Brent
Langston; Deputy Washington County Attorney; attorneys for appellee.
Douglas D. Terry; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Grover, No. 20010262 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3210
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA TO FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, A SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404 (1999); 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE G. RAND 
BEACHAM PRESIDING 
DOUGLAS D. TERRY 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
JEFFREY T. COLEMERE (8527) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
W. BRENT LANGSTON (5104) 
Deputy Washington Counp f f^ '&U 
Utah Court of Aorwwls 
ATTORNEYS FOR A P P ^ ^ L E ^ ^ 
Clark of ttie dawt 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




Case No. 20010262-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA TO FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, A SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404 (1999); 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE G. RAND 
BEACHAM PRESIDING 
DOUGLAS D. TERRY 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
JEFFREY T. COLEMERE (8527) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
W. BRENT LANGSTON (5104) 
Deputy Washington County Attorney. 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES in 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS I 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 3 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 8 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS COMPETENT TO ENTER HIS GUILTY PLEA; 
IN ANY EVENT, GIVEN THE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING 
WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 9 
A. Defendant has not marshaled the evidence in support of 
the trial court's finding of competency 10 
B. The trial court's finding that defendant was competent 
was not clearly erroneous 11 
II. WHERE DEFENDANT WAS COMPETENT TO ENTER A GUILTY 
PLEA, HE FAILS TO SHOW HOW HE WAS PREJUDICED BY HIS 




ADDENDUM A - Utah R. Cnm. P. 11 
Utah R. App. P. 23 B 
Utah R. App. P. 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 (1999) 
ADDENDUM B - Entry of Plea transcript, June 5, 1997 
ADDENDUM C - State v Grover, Memorandum Decision of Feb. 27, 2001 
u 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993) 16 
State v.Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439 (Utah 1996) 16 
State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, 983 P.2d 556 10 
State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37 14 
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 1108 10, 14 
State v. Holland,92l P.2d 430 (Utah 1996) 11, 14, 15 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12P.3d92 15, 17 
State v.Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26P.3d203 2,9, 16 
State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79 15, 17 
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 (Utah App. 1994) 2 
State v. Widdison,200\ UT 60, 28 P.3d 1278 10, 11 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1999) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 (1999) 2, 14 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1996) 1 
Utah R. App. P. 23B 2 
Utah R. App. P. 24 2, 14 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11 2 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20010262-CA 
ALVIE GROVER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea to 
forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 
(1999); in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Washington County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable G. Rand Beacham presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea where the evidence clearly indicated that defendant was 
competent to enter a plea? 
1 
Standard of Review: wThe denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous 
standard for findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision/' State v. Martinez, 
2001 UT 12,«[ 14, 26P.3d203. 
Issue No. 2: Where defendant was competent to enter a plea, was defendant 
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to timely obtain a competency evaluation? 
Standard of Review: "When . . . the claim of ineffective assistance [of counsel] is 
raised for the first time on appeal, [an appellate court] resolve[s] the issue as a matter of 
law." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994) (footnote omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11; 
Utah R. App. P. 23B; 
Utah R. App. P. 24; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 (1999). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1 
On March 31, 1997, defendant's minor daughter told a child protection worker that 
defendant repeatedly raped and sodomized her between 1993 and 1995 while she lived in 
his home. R. 3-4 
* * * 
Defendant was charged by information with rape of a child and sodomy on a child, 
both first degree felonies. R. 1-2 Pursuant to a plea agreement, on June 5, 1997, 
defendant pled guilty to forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony. R. 23-31. 
During his plea hearing, defendant was asked various questions by the court, and 
he responded appropriately tn a clear and coherent manner. R. 155. At the onset of the 
plea hearing, the tnal court inquired whether defendant was "currently under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or medication[.] R. 155:7. Without hesitation, defendant 
responded, "No, your Honor." Id. Defendant was also asked whether he was "suffering 
from any mental or physical disease or defect that makes it hard for [him] to understand 
what [he is] domg[.]" Id. Again, defendant responded in the negative. Id. 
The tnal court also questioned defendant about the written plea statement that he 
had signed and initialed. R. 155:6-7. Defendant indicated that he had read the agreement 
and understood its terms. Id. In that agreement, defense counsel indicated that he had 
!To avoid unnecessary repetition, the State has combined its Statement of the Case 
and Statement of the Facts. 
3 
"discussed [the plea agreement] with the [defendant and beheve[d] that the [djefendant 
fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent " 
R. 24-29. 
After entering his plea, defendant requested that he be sentenced immediately 
without the benefit of a presentence report. R. 155.12. The trial court honored 
defendant's request and sentenced him to the statutory indeterminate pnson term of one to 
fifteen years. R. 32-36; 155; 161:20-21. 
Defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea and requests the appointment of an 
alienist. On June 18, 1997, defendant filed a timely Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and 
Petition for Determining Competency and Appointment of Alienist. R. 38-41. In 
response, the court ordered the appointment of an alienist. R. 43-45; 154. Defendant 
filed an Amended Petition for Determining Competency and Appointment of Alienist on 
September 23, 1997. R. 52-54. At a hearing on October 7, 1997, the court reentered its 
order for the appointment of an alienist. R. 55; 156. 
Alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant filed a notice of appeal on 
August 14, 1997. R. 46-49. In a memorandum decision dated January 23, 1998, this 
Court dismissed defendant's appeal on jurisdictional grounds. R. 62-64. The case was 
remitted to the trial court on January 23, 1998. R. 60-61. 
On November 4, 1999, the court held a hearing in response to defendant's request 
for new counsel. R. 69-70; 157:3-4. At the hearing, counsel for defendant stated that he 
4 
had attempted to have an alienist appointed but was unsuccessful because defendant had 
been transferred from Purgatory Correctional Facility to the Utah State Prison for two 
years, and the prison would not honor the trial court's order. R. 157:4-7. Because 
defendant was presently housed locally at Purgatory Correctional Facility, the court 
denied defendant's request for new counsel and ordered that an alienist be appointed 
within the following two weeks. R. 157:8-10. 
The court reviewed the status of defendant's case two weeks later, on November 
18,1999. R. 72-73; 158. At that point, still no alienist had been appointed. R. 158.3-5 
As a result, the court chastised defendant's counsel for his inaction and relieved him as 
defendant's counsel. R. 158:10-11. Defendant was appointed a new attorney. R. 158:11-
13. 
Later that same month, John Moyes, an alienist, met with defendant at the jail R. 
163:5-6, 38-39. For an hour, Moyes spoke with defendant, asking him numerous 
questions. R. 163:38-39. At that point, Moyes determined that it would be an impossible 
task to determine whether defendant was competent during his plea hearing 30 months 
prior. R. 163:5-6,38-39. 
The evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. On 
February 6, 2001, following a string of continuances and frivolous pro se motions, the 
trial court held an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
R. 81-88,90-96,98-111, 113-16; 161; 162; 163. 
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At that heanng, defendant testified that he had suffered from drug-induced 
delusions at the time his guilty plea was entered. See R. 163:30-57. In particular, 
defendant claimed that in March of 1997, three months before his plea heanng, he caught 
his wife putting drugs into his food, and on his cigarettes. R. 163:32-35, 41-44. As a 
result of his wife's actions, he began to suffer from drug-induced dementia. R. 163:35. 
Defendant claimed that he began heanng bells in his sleep, and voices dunng the day. R. 
163:35-38. The voices inducted him into a "secret society," instructed him to treat 
judges as if they were God, and told him to trust the judicial system. R. 163:37, 48-50. -
Dunng his plea heanng, defendant testified that he felt as though his head was in a 
"blender," and was unable to concentrate for a span of "three seconds." R. 163: 37, 47-
50. This condition caused defendant to forget his thoughts. Id. Due to those delusions, 
defendant claimed that he was not competent to enter a guilty plea. R. 163. 
On cross-examination, however, defendant clanfied that his delusions came in 
episodes. R. 163:55-56. Defendant could not explain why he pled guilty to a DUI 
offense and was sentenced to probation during the same period of time he claimed to have 
been suffenng from drug-induced dementia, and yet did not seek to withdraw that plea. 
R. 163:54-57. Defendant also admitted that he did not inform the court of his alleged 
drug delusions before entering his plea, but had only divulged the delusions after he was 
sentenced to a prison term. R. 163:48. Additionally, defendant did not provide 
documentation and witnesses to corroborate his story that his wife had drugged him or 
6 
that prison officials and doctors were aware of his alleged mental condition. R. 163 32-
35^  41-47 Finally, despite allegedly suffering from a mental illness that affected his 
ability to concentrate for a span of "three seconds," made his head feel like it was in a 
"blender," and caused him to forget his thoughts, defendant admitted that he was able to 
appropriately answer the court's questions throughout the plea hearing and now, four 
years later, could distinctly remember his thought patterns during that hearing. R. 163' 
37,47-50. 
Defendant called Agent Frank Martin to testify that a year before the plea hearing, 
he witnessed defendant acting strangely. R. 163:10-16. 
After reviewing the video recording of defendant's plea hearing, see R. 163:17-30, 
and listening to the testimony from Agent Martin and defendant, see R. 163:10-16, 30-57, 
the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision denying defendant's motion to withdraw 
his plea. See R. 119-125. The court found that defendant had not shown good cause to 
withdraw his plea because (1) Agent Martin's testimony was not relevant to the specific 
time-frame of defendant's plea hearing, (2) defendant's testimony was entirely subjective, 
uncorroborated by any contemporaneous source, and too self-serving to be persuasive, 
and (3) on the video recording of defendant's plea hearing, defendant appeared to be 
responsive, alert, and entirely lucid throughout his colloquy with the court. See id. 
7 
ARGUMENT SLMMARY 
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's finding that he was competent to 
enter a guilty plea. Defendant wholly fails to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court's competency findings, or show how those findings were insufficient. Thus, 
defendant has not shown that the court's finding of competency was clearly erroneous. 
In any event, given the clear evidence of defendant's competency, the trial court 
correctly concluded that defendant was competent to plead guilty The videotape of 
defendant's plea hearing, as well as his plea statement, show that defendant was alert, 
lucid, and responsive to the court's questions and that he possessed the ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and had a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the charges against him. 
Next, defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 
because of his attorney's inaction in timely securing an alienist's examination after his 
plea hearing. Under the second prong of the Strickland test, defendant cannot show that 
he was prejudiced by his counsel's inaction, because he has presented no credible 
evidence that he was incompetent. Furthermore, to the extent that defendant claims that 
an alienist's exam would have corroborated his testimony, he failed to request a rule 23B 
remand to remedy that gap in the record. Accordingly, defendant's ineffective assistance 




DEFENDANT FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS COMPETENT TO ENTER HIS 
GUILTY PLEA; IN ANY EVENT, GIVEN THE 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S 
COMPETENCY, THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING 
WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. Br. of Aplt. at 5-8. The crux of defendant's argument is that he was incompetent to 
enter a guilty plea. See id. Defendant does not claim that he was insane when he entered 
his guilty plea. Rather, he claims at the time he entered his plea, he was suffering from a 
drug-induced dementia that rendered him incompetent to plead guilty. Id. Defendant's 
claim is really a challenge to the trial court's finding that he was responsive, alert, and 
lucid throughout the plea hearing, and therefore, competent to enter his plea. Because 
defendant neglects to properly marshal the clear evidence in support of the trial court's 
factual findings, and fails to show that those findings were clearly erroneous, his claim 
fails.2 
2
 Although defendant cites cases interpreting rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, defendant does not claim that the trial court failed to strictly comply with the 
requirements of rule 11(e). See Br. of Aplt. at 5-8. Indeed, on appeal defendant concedes 
that "[rjule 11 had been complied with at the time [he] entered his guilty plea." Br. of 
Aplt. at 7. Thus, where the trial court strictly complied with the requirements of rule 
11(e), defendant's plea is presumed to be knowingly and voluntarily offered. See State v 
Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 22, 26 P.3d 203. 
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A. Defendant has not marshaled the evidence in support of the trial 
court's finding of competency. 
"A trial court's factual findings will not be reversed absent clear error." State v. 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, «[ 60, 28 P.3d 1278. "To demonstrate that a finding of fact is 
clearly erroneous, the defendant 'must first marshal all the evidence that supports the tnal 
court's findings. After marshaling the supportive evidence, the appellant then must show 
that, even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, 
the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings.'" Id. (citing State v. 
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 n. 2, 1 P.3d 1108) (emphasis in original). 
In this case, defendant has not met his marshaling burden. In his brief, defendant 
does not set forth any of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings; rather, he 
merely notes the portions of the record which favor his position. See Br. of Aplt. at 4-8. 
Further, defendant fails to show that the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable 
to the trial court's ruling, is insufficient to support the trial court's findings. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 4, 7 (citing only defendant's testimony that he was suffering from drug-induced 
mental problems during his plea hearing, the trial court's order appointing an alienist 
which was never fully executed, and the State's stipulation to that order as evidence of 
defendant's incompetency). Where defendant fails to marshal the evidence and show that 
the evidence was insufficient, he cannot show that the trial court's finding that he was 
"responsive," "alert," and "lucid" was clearly erroneous. See State v. Benvenuto, 1999 
UT 60, <[ 13, 983 P.2d 556 (where the defendant made no attempt to marshal the 
10 
evidence, the trial court's findings were accepted as stated in its ruling on the defendant s 
motion to withdraw his plea). Thus, defendant's challenge to the court's factual findings 
fails. See Widdison, 2001 UT 60,1f 60. 
B. The trial court's finding that defendant was competent was not clearly 
erroneous. 
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to marshal, defendant fails to show that the 
trial court's competency finding was clearly erroneous.3 "In determining whether a 
defendant is competent to plead guilty, the trial court must consider whether the 
defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him." State v Holland, 921 P 2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996). 
Here, the evidence supporting the trial court's competency determination was 
substantial. In determining that defendant was competent to plead guilty, the trial court 
considered defendant's testimony and that of Agent Martin, a videotape of defendant's 
demeanor and statements during his plea heanng, and defendant's plea agreement. See R. 
163. After reviewing that evidence, the court found that the videotape and defendant's 
plea agreement were more credible than defendant's self-serving testimony. See R. 119-
25. 
'The trial court investigated defendant's competency claim dunng the heanng of 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See R. 163. In its ruling on defendant's 
motion to withdraw, under the rubnc of a "good cause1' determination the tnal court 
found that defendant had a full knowledge and understanding of his plea. See R. 119-25 
Although the court found that defendant was responsive, alert, and lucid throughout the 
plea heanng, in effect, court found that defendant was competent to enter a plea. See id 
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On the videotape, before learning of his prison sentence, defendant acknowledged 
that his state of mind was not in any wa> impaired by drugs or mental disease and defects 
See R 163 22 He also participated in an extensive colloquy with the court, in which he 
responded timely and appropriately to the court's lengthy inquiries See R. 163 20-28 
Dunng that colloquy, defendant indicated to the court that he understood the proceedings 
against him. See id. Specifically, defendant stated that he understood the factual nature 
of the case against him, that he was waiving certain constitutional rights, and that he 
understood the maximum penalties associated with his crime See id Defendant also 
indicated that he agreed with his attorney in supporting the State's factual basis for his 
guilty plea. See R. 163 26. Moreover, as the tnal court observed, defendant's demeanor 
dunng the plea heanng was "responsive, alert, and entirely lucid." See R. 119-25 Based 
on that evidence, the court concluded that defendant had a full knowledge and 
understanding of his plea. See id. 
Similarly, deferent's plea agreement corroborates his statements dunng the plea 
heanng At the end of defendant's plea agreement statement, defense counsel indicated 
that he had "discussed [the plea agreement] with the [djefendant and beheve[d] that the 
[defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent." R. 24-29. By signing and initialing the plea agreement, defendant again 
indicated that he understood the proceedings against him and was able to consult with his 
attorney in a rational fashion. See id. 
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In contrast to the videotape and defendant's plea agreement, the court found 
defendant's testimonial evidence to be irrelevant to his plea hearing See R. 119-25 In 
particular, the court found that although defendant claimed he was being drugged by his 
wife, he did not testify that she was drugging him when he entered his plea. See R 119-
25, 163 32-35, 41-44. Indeed, defendant had expressly denied to the court that he was 
under the influence of any drugs or medication at that time. See R. 155 7 The court also 
found that Agent Martin's testimony about an incident that occurred a year before 
defendant's plea hearing was irrelevant to the time of defendant's plea hearing. See R 
119-25. 
The court also found defendant's testimony was uncorroborated by any 
contemporaneous sources. See id. Although defendant claimed that the prison officials 
and doctors were aware of his alleged mental condition, he was unable to provide 
documentation of doctor visits or witnesses to substantiate that claim. See R. 163 44-47 
Furthermore, defendant did not present his wife's testimony to corroborate his tale See 
generally R. 163. 
Finally, the trial court found that defendant's testimony was unpersuasive. When 
defendant was asked about his alleged confusion in signing the plea agreement, he 
unconvincingly asserted that "[he] wasn't supposed to go to prison." See R 119-25 
Moreover, despite allegedly suffering from a mental illness that affected his ability to 
concentrate for a span of "three seconds," made his head feel like it was in a "blender," 
13 
and caused him to forget his thoughts, defendant was able to appropriately answer the 
court's questions during the plea hearing and now, four years later, could distinctly 
remember his thought patterns during that hearing. R. 163: 37, 47-50. Accordingly, the 
trial court correctly concluded that defendant's testimonial evidence was irrelevant, 
uncorroborated, and "[was] simply too subjective and self-serving to be persuasive/' R. 
119-25. 
In sum, the evidence conclusively demonstrated that at the time of his plea hearing, 
defendant possessed a "sufficient [] ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding and ha[d] a rational as well as factual understanding of 
the proceedings against him." Holland, 921 P.2d 430 at 433. Accordingly, the trial court 
correctly concluded that defendant was competent to plead guilty and did not abuse its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.4 
4In addition, for the first time on appeal, defendant contends that the trial court 
erred under Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 (1999) by not staying the hearing on defendant's 
motion to withdraw hiis guilty plea until an alienist had examined defendant and the court 
had made a determination as to defendant's competency. Br. of Aplt. at 7-8. For the 
following reasons, defendant's claim fails. First, defendant did not ask the trial court to 
stay or continue the hearing. See generally R. 163; State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, <} 9 ("As a 
general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.") 
(citations and quotations omitted). Thus, where defendant fails to argue either plain error 
or exceptional circumstances his claim is waived on appeal. See id. Second, although 
defendant cites section 77-15-5, his claim is cursorily treated and he fails to offer any 
supporting authority or meaningful analysis. See Br. of Aplt. at 7-8; Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9) ('The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on."); Gamblin, 2000 UT 44 at J^ 6 (u[An appellate court] is not a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
14 
POINT II 
WHERE DEFENDANT WAS COMPETENT TO ENTER 
A GUILTY PLEA, HE FAILS TO SHOW HOW HE 
WAS PREJUDICED BY HIS COUNSELS INACTION 
IN OBTAINING AN ALIENIST 
Defendant next claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
because his counsel did not initially ensure that a competency evaluation was performed 
as ordered by the court. Br. of Aplt. at 8-10. "With respect to any ineffectiveness claim, 
a defendant must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment/' State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76,1[ 19, 12 P.3d 92, (quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89 
(1984)). "Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Id. Defendant's claim fails 
because he cannot establish prejudice. See State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, Tf 14 
(where a defendant fails to establish either prong of the Strickland test, counsel's 
research.") (citations and quotations omitted). Third, thirty months after defendant's 
guilty plea, Moyes, an alienist, told defendant that it would be impossible to determine 
whether defendant was suffering from drug-induced dementia at the plea hearing. See R. 
163:5-6, 38-39. Therefore, given the impossibility of such a determination, a stay of 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea would have been fruitless. See Holland, 921 
P.2d 430 at 435 (competency to enter a guilty plea could not be determined years after the 
plea hearing). Moreover, it is doubtful that a alienist could have made an accurate 
determination of whether defendant was under the influence of drugs even 30 days after 
defendant's plea hearing. Finally, at his plea hearing defendant failed to raise a 
^substantial question of possible doubfas to his competency, and therefore, he was not 
entitled to a competency hearing under section 77-15-5. See Holland, 921 P.2d 430 at 
435. 
15 
assistance was constitutionally sufficient, and the other prong of the test need not be 
addressed); State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, If 17, 26 P.3d 203 (inasmuch as the prejudice 
prong of the Strickland test is dispositive, the first prong need not be addressed). 
"To show prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test, a defendant 
must proffer sufficient evidence to support a reasonable probability that, but for his 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). "A reasonable probability is sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
Assuming, but not conceding that council's performance was deficient, because 
defendant has not shown that he was incompetent during his plea hearing, he cannot show 
that he was prejudiced by his counsel's inaction in timely obtaining an alienist to 
examine defendant. As stated, defendant's only claim of incompetence was that he was 
suffering under a drug-induced dementia at the time of his plea hearing. However, the 
evidence of defendant's demeanor at the hearing, and his attorney's statements, all refute 
that claim. Therefore, defendant's claim that an alienist would have found him 
incompetent is nothing more than unsupported speculation. See Fernandez v. Cook, 870 
P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) ("[Pjroof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a 
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality."). 
16 
Moreover, to the extent that defendant is claiming that his counsel's failure to 
timely secure an alienist's examination depnved him of the only objective evidence of his 
alleged incompetency, his claim also fails. "Where tnal counsel's alleged ineffectiveness 
caused or exacerbated record deficiencies, defendant[] now [has] an appropriate 
procedural tool for remedying those deficiencies." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, «[ 16. "If a 
defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the 
record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was 
ineffective,' defendant bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for a 
temporary remand [under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure]/' Id (citing Utah 
R. App. P. 23B). Because defendant failed to remedy any gap in the evidence by 
requesting a rule 23B remand for an alienist to testify, his claim also fails. Accordingly, 
where defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's inactions, he 
cannot prove that his counsel was ineffective See Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, ^  14, 
Martinez, 2001 UT 12,117. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Dated this / 5 ^ d a y of April, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEFFREY t . COLEiMERE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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Rule 11. Pleas. 
«a> Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
<c> A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
<d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury tnal . 
<e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the nght to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
<4)(A> the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or. if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient e^  -iderce to psMb' -H a .-jb^f-intial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if ust?a, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the 
English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been read 
or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
tgWl) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; Novem-
ber 1, 2001.) 
Rule 23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to 
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may 
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, 
necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative 
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, 
could support a determination that counsel was ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellants brief. Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing 
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed 
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from 
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim 
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be 
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The 
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the 
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall 
also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the 
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The 
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffec-
tiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to 
be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the 
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be 
filed within 10 days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule 
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to 
the tnal court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel The ->rder of remand shall identify the 
ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the tnal 
court to complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the 
order of remand, absent a finding by the tnal court of good cause for a delay of 
reasonable length. 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on 
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that 
counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or 
retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be 
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural 
steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, 
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties 
or upon th^xourt's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall 
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the 
findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand 
shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court 
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consider-
ation of issues not specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary 
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after 
remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. 
The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court 
shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient perfor-
mance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, 
in accordance with the order of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be 
completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court 
finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings 
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the 
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings 
upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original 
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate 
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental 
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial 
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for 
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made 
during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. 
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the 
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
(Added effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
ta) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
( D A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made 
in the body of the bnef. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding.' 
110) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum 
shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
*B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but 
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant, or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum 
of the appellant The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the bnef of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a bnef in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal Reply bnefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing bnef The content of the reply bnef shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule No further 
bnefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court 
(d) References in briefs to parties Counsel will be expected in their bnefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee " It promotes clanty to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names of parties, or descnptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured 
person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record References shall be made to the pages 
of the onginal record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g) References to pages of published depositions or 
transcnpts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom nght corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcnpt as marked by 
the tramscnber References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected 
(0 Length of briefs Except by permission of the court, pnncipal bnefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply bnefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required bv 
paragraph (a) of this rule In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of bnefs 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of 
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders The bnef of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length The bnef 
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments in-
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the bnef of the appellant 
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length The appellant shall then file a bnef 
which contains an answer to the onginal issues raised by the appellee/cross-
appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the 
appellants opening bnef. The appellant's second bnef shall not exceed 25 
pages in length The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second bnef, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's 
answers to the onginal issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first 
bnef The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table 
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the 
court The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single bnef, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the bnef of another 
Parties may similarly join in reply bnefs 
ii) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the oflFending 
lawyer. 
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999.) 
77-15-5. Order for hearing — Stay of other proceedings — 
Examinations of defendant — Scope of examina-
tion and report. 
(1) When a petition is filed pursuant to Section 77-15-3 raising the issue of 
the defendant's competency to stand trial or when the court raises the issue of 
the defendant's competency pursuant to Section 77-15-4, the court in which 
proceedings are pending shall stay all proceedings If the proceedings are in a 
court other than the district court in which the petition is filed, the district 
court shall notify that court of the filing of the petition The district court in 
which the petition is filed shall pass upon the suffiaency of the allegations of 
incompetency If a petition is opposed by either party, the court shall, prior to 
granting or denying the petition, hold a limited hearing solely for the purpose 
of determining the suffiaency of the petition If the court finds that the 
allegations of incompetency raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendants 
competency to stand trial, it shall enter an order for a hearing on the mental 
condition of the person who is the subject of the petition. 
INQUIRY INTO SANITY OF DEFENDANT 
12) (a) After the granting of a petition and pnor to a full competency 
hearing, the court may order the Department of Human Services to 
examine the person and to report to the court concerning the defendant's 
mental condition. 
lb) The defendant shall be examined by at least two mental health 
experts not involved in the current treatment of the defendant 
(c) If the issue is suffiaently raised in the petition or if it becomes 
apparent that the defendant may be incompetent due to mental retarda-
tion, at least one expert expenenced in mental retardation assessment 
shall evaluate the defendant. Upon appointment of the experts, the 
petitioner or other party as directed by the court shall provide information 
and materials to the examiners relevant to a determination of the 
defendant's competency and shall provide copies of the charging docu-
ment, arrest or incident reports pertaining to the charged offense, known 
criminal history information, and known pnor mental health evaluations 
and treatments. 
(d) The court may make the necessary orders to provide the information 
listed in Subsection (c) to the examiners. 
(3) During the examination under Subsection (2), unless the court or the 
executive director of the department directs otherwise, the defendant shall be 
retained in the same custody or status he was in at the time the examination 
was ordered. 
14) The experts shall in the conduct of their examination and in their report 
to the court consider and address, in addition to any other factors determined 
to be relevant by the experts: 
(a) the defendant's present capaaty to: 
li) comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations against 
him; 
(u) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind, 
(m) comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of possible 
penalties, if applicable, that may be imposed in the proceedings 
against him, 
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options, 
(v) understand the adversary nature of the proceedings against 
him; 
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior, and 
(vu) testify relevantly, if applicable, 
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on 
the nature and quality of the defendant's relationship with counsel, 
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently being administered 
(1) whether the medication is necessary to mam tain the defendant's 
competency; and 
(ii) the effect of the medication, if any, on the defendant's demeanor 
and affect and ability to participate in the proceedings 
(5) If the expert's opinion is that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, 
the expert shall indicate in the report: 
(a) which of the above factors contributes to the defendant's incompe-
tency; 
i b) the nature of the defendant's mental disorder or mental retardation 
and its relationship to the factors contributing to the defendant's incom-
petency; 
(c) the treatment or treatments appropriate and available, and 
(d) the defendant's capacity to give informed consent to treatment to 
restore competency 
(6) The experts examining the defendant shall provide an initial report to 
the court and the prosecuting and defense attorneys within 30 days of the 
receipt of the court's order The report shall inform the court of the examiner's 
opinion concerning the competency of the defendant to stand trial, or, in the 
alternative, the examiner may inform the court in writing that additional time 
is needed to complete the report If the examiner informs the court that 
additional time is needed, the examiner shall have up to an additional 30 days 
to provide the report to the court and counsel The examiner must provide the 
report within 60 days from the receipt of the court's order unless, for good 
cause shown, the court authorizes an additional period of time to complete the 
examination and provide the report 
(7) Any written report submitted by the experts shall* 
(a) identify the specific matters referred for evaluation; 
(b) describe the procedures, techniques, and tests used m the examina-
tion and the purpose or purposes for each, 
(c) state the expert's clinical observations, findings, and opinions on 
each issue referred for examination by the court, and indicate specifically 
those issues, if any, on which the expert could not give an opinion, and 
(d) identify the sources of information used by the expert and present 
the basis for the expert's clinical findings and opinions. 
(8) (a) Any statement made by the defendant m the course of any compe-
tency examination, whether the examination is with or without the 
consent of the defendant, any testimony by the expert based upon such 
statement, and any other fruits of the statement may not be admitted in 
evidence against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an 
issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced 
evidence The evidence may be admitted, however, where relevant to a 
determination of the defendant's competency 
(b) Prior to examining the defendant, examiners should specifically 
advise the defendant of the limits of confidentiality as provided under this 
subsection 
(9) When the report is received the court shall set a date for a mental 
heanng which shall be held in not less than five and not more than 15 days, 
unless the court enlarges the time for good cause The heanng shall be 
conducted according to the procedures outlined in Subsections 62A-12-
234(9)(b) through (9)(f) Any person or organization directed by the depart-
ment to conduct the examination may be subpoenaed to testify at the heanng 
If the experts are in conflict as to the competency of the defendant, all experts 
should be called to testify at the hearing if reasonably available The court may 
call any examiner to testify at the heanng who is not called by the parties If 
the court calls an examiner, counsel for the parties may cross-examine the 
expert 
10) A person shall be presumed competent unless the court, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, finds the person incompetent to proceed The burden 
of proof is upon the proponent of incompetency at the hearing An adjudication 
of incompetency to proceed shall not operate as an adjudication of incompe-
tency to give informed consent for medical treatment or for any other purpose, 
unless specifically set forth m the court order 
(11) (a) If the court finds the defendant incompetent to stand trial, its order 
shall contain findings addressing each of the factors in Subsections 
77-15-5(4)(a) and (b) The order issued pursuant to Subsection 77-15-6( 1) 
which the court 3ends to the facility where the defendant is committed or 
to the person who is responsible for assessing his progress toward 
competency shall be provided contemporaneously with the transportation 
and commitment order of the defendant, unless exigent circumstances 
require earlier commitment in which case the court shall forward the 
order within five working days of the order of transportation and commit-
ment of the defendant. 
(b) The order finding the defendant mcompetent to stand trial shall be 
accompanied by: 
d) copies of the reports of the experts filed with the court pursuant 
to the order of examination if not provided previously; 
(u) copies of any of the psychiatric, psychological, or social work 
reports submitted to the court relative to the mental condition of the 
defendant; 
(m) any other documents made available to the court by either the 
defense or the prosecution, pertaining to the defendant's current or 
past mental condition. 
(12) If the court finds it necessary to order the defendant transported prior 
to the completion of findings and compdation of documents required under 
Subsection ill), the transportation and commitment order delivering the 
defendant to the Utah State Hospital, or other mental health facility as 
directed by the executive director of the Department of Human Services or his 
designee, shall indicate that the defendant's commitment is based upon a 
finding of incompetency, and the mental health facility's copy of the order shall 
be accompanied by the reports of any experts filed with the court pursuant to 
the order of examination. The executive director of the Department of Human 
Services or his designee may refuse to accept a defendant as a patient unless 
he is accompanied by a transportation and commitment order which is 
accompanied by the reports. 
(13) Upon a finding of incompetency to stand trial by the court, the 
prosecuting and defense attorneys shall provide information and materials 
relevant to the defendant's competency to the facility where the defendant is 
committed or to the person responsible for assessing his progress towards 
competency In addition to any other materials, the prosecuting attorney shall 
provide: 
(a) copies of the charging document and supporting affidavits or other 
documents used in the determination of probable cause, 
(b) arrest or incident reports prepared by a law enforcement agency 
pertaining to the charged offense, 
(c) information concerning the defendant's known criminal history 
(14) The court may make any reasonable order to insure compliance with 
this section. 




























IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT - ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
ALVIE JARED GROVER, 
Defendant. 
ENTRY OF PLEA 
Case #971500413 
Appeal #970245 
Judge James L. Shumate 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on June 5, 1997. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 




PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - LIC. ^-lU/ail-/aui 
SALEM, UT 84653 
PHONE: (801) 423-1009 FAX: (801) 423-2663 
A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S 
FOR STATE OF UTAH: 
W. BRENT LANGSTON, ESQ. 
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
178 NORTH 200 EAST 
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770 
FOR DEFENDANT: 
ODEAN BOWLER, ESQ. 
205 EAST TABERNACLE STREET, #200 
ST. GEORGE UT 84770 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE REF 
DISCUSSION PLEA AGREEMENT 3 
EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS 5 
ENTRY OF PLEA 11 
SENTENCING 14 
DISMISSAL OF CASE 971500405. . . . 15 
E-X-H-I-B-I-T-S 




(June 5, 1997) 
THE JUDGE: And finally, State of Utah versus Alvie 
Grover, 971500405 and 971500413. 
MR. BOWLER: May we approach, Your Honor? 
THE JUDGE: Pardon? 
MR. LANGSTON: Can we approach? 
THE JUDGE: Sure. 
(Sidebar discussion). 
MR. LANGSTON: I should have brought it up. What 
we're anticipating doing is reducing the charge to a second 
degree felony, one second degree. He is anticipating that 
there, he knows the recommendation is going to be prison. 
MR. BOWLER: And he wants to have the sentencing 
done today, so... 
MR. LANGSTON: He wants to do it today. So he 
didn't want to go up there with a sexual abuse of a child on 
his rap sheet. I agreed to talk to the victim and they agreed 
to just call it forcible sexual abuse without listing the 
child, I wanted the Court to know why we agreed to do that. 
THE JUDGE: I see. 
MR. LANGSTON: And I guess if he wants to go ahead 
today we're (short inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: I understand there is additional danger 
there. 

























MR. LANGSTON: Yes. So, so that's why. 
THE JUDGE: Do you have an Amended Information? 
MR. LANGSTON: I do. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. LANGSTON: I do, I have it. 
MR. BOWLER: Yes. Everything's set. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
(End sidebar discussion). 
THE JUDGE: Now I understand what you're doing on 
the felony case. What about the misdemeanor case? 
MR. LANGSTON: Your Honor, we would agree to 
dismiss the charges in that case. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. LANGSTON: I don't think I specifically stated 
that in the plea agreement but that is (short inaudible, no 
mic). 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Let's deal with the case endmc 
413 first then. 
MR. LANGSTON: Okay. I have the paperwork here. 
THE JUDGE: Thanks. 
MR. LANGSTON: I think I signed that. I'm not... 
The plea agreement. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. LANGSTON: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. All right. Anything else /ou 



























want to say about this before I discuss it with Mr. Grover? 
MR. BOWLER: Your Honor, there is one other thing 
we had, Your Honor, there is an order to show cause out— 
MR. LANGSTON: Oh, on another misdemeanor case? 
MR. BOWLER: On another misdemeanor case. And 
part of the agreement would be that this would be (short 
inaudible, no mic) concurrent with anything that happens on 
that order to show cause. 
MR. LANGSTON: I didn't bring that file with me but 
we did list the case number in the plea agreement that we 
would agree to, he would admit to a probation violation and 
that, that was pending and then I think that was a 
misdemeanor. Right? 
MR. BOWLER: Yes, it was. 
MR. LANGSTON: And we would just ask that... In 
fact, I don't know, perhaps just close that unsuccessfully and 
sentence him on this one. 
MR. BOWLER: That would be fine. 
THE JUDGE: That's something that could be done 
just on paperwork anyway then. 
MR. LANGSTON: I think so. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. Let me review this 
with you, Mr. Grover. The name I have is Alvie Grover, is 
that your full name? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 



























THE JUDGE: Okay. I have your birthdate as 
3-26-62. is that accurate? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Correct, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Grover, have you read the 
Amended Information that I've just been given which would 
charge you with forcible sexual abuse, a second degree 
felony? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: I have, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Do you have any questions about that or 
is there anything you'd like to have me read for you? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Have you also read this 
Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea Agreement? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Do you have any questions about what it 
says? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: It looks like it's been initialled and 
signed by you today. Is that correct? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: That is correct, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Did you read it first before you signed 
it? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: I did. 
THE JUDGE: Did you sign it and initial it to 
indicate that you accept the*?** t-prms and you understand them? 



























DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, I did, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. This does say that you will 
plead guilty to this second degree felony charge. Is that 
what you want to do? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Has anyone made any threats against you 
to get you to plead guilty? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Has anyone promised you anything that's 
not in this plea agreement and I haven't been told? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Not that I'm aware of, Your 
Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Are you currently under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or medication? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Are you suffering from any mental or 
physical disease or defect that makes it hard for you to 
understand what you're doing? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Grover, you need to 
understand your alternatives. You have been ordered to stanc 
trial on the case after waiving your preliminary hearing. 
But you're still entitled to have your trial because you're 
still presumed to be innocent until you enter a, a plea other 
than not guilty. 

























The presumption of innocence means that if you 
dispute this charge, and I'd be referring to the original 
charge in particular, the original charges, then you would not 
be convicted unless the state could prove you guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If they don't have that kind of proof you 
can't be convicted. 
Do you understand that? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. If you would prefer to have 
your case go to trial then and force the state to try to bear 
the burden of proof, you have a right to do that. 
You have the right to a jury trial with an impartial 
jury and have it scheduled on a speedy basis, which means 
really without any unreasonable delay, and you have a right to 
be present at all times during the trial with your attorney. 
You have the right to confront and cross examine all 
the witnesses who testify against you, and you also have the 
right to call your own witnesses to testify. 
You have the right to have the court order your 
witnesses to appear by subpoenas issued by the court and 
served on them. 
You would also have the right to testify at your 
trial if you want to but you have a constitutional right to 
remain silent and that applies throughout your trial. If you 
don't want to testify at the trial no one will force you to do 



























that, and the jury will be instructed that they cannot 
consider that evidence that you're hiding something or 
evidence that you're guilty in any way. The state has to be 
able to bear the burden of proof regardless of whether you say 
anything, otherwise you can't be convicted. 
Do you have any questions about any of that? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Grover, if you plead guilty 
to this charge in the Amended Information you will be 
admitting that you committed that offense and by admitting it 
you'll be giving up your right to have a trial and you'll be 
subjecting yourself to sentencing because you'd be convicted 
without a trial. 
Do you understand that's how this works? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. If you're convicted of a second 
degree felony the maximum sentence would be a term at the Utah 
State Prison not less than one year and not more than 15 
years. There also could be a $10,000 fine plus a percentage 
surcharge, and an order to pay restitution for any damages 
that might have been caused. 
Do you understand those maximum possibilities? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. There have been no particular 
recommendations made to me on this case. Regardless of what 

























the attorneys may recommend you need to understand that the 
Court can impose the maximum sentence. 
Do you understand? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: I understand, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Grover, another important 
right that you give up if you plead guilty is your right to 
appeal. If you decided you'd prefer to have your case go to 
trial, and even if you were found guilty by the jury, you'd 
still have the right to appeal to a higher court to see if you 
could get the conviction overturned. But if you plead guilty 
voluntarily you're also giving up your right to appeal your 
conviction for almost every possible reason. 
Do you understand that? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Grover, if you changed your mind 
about this plea you'd have to do it within the next 30 days, 
and you'd also have to file a written request to withdraw the 
plea within the 30 days. But you have to have the Court's 
permission so you have to meet that 30-day deadline and be 
able to prove that there's some good cause for you to withdraw 
your plea. You cannot withdraw a plea just by stating that 
you've changed your mind. The Court has to approve it. 
Do you understand that? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Grover, do you have any 


























questions now about anything? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Counsel, have I missed anything or do 
you know of any reason not to accept this plea? 
MR. LANGSTON: I believe the Court's covered it 
all, Your Honor. 
MR. BOWLER: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Grover, I'll ask for your 
plea then. As I said the Amended Information filed today 
charges you with forcible sexual abuse, a second degree 
felony, alleged to have occurred during the years 1993 through 
1995 in Washington County. How do you plead to that 
charge? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Guilty. 
THE JUDGE: What's the factual basis? 
MR. LANGSTON: The State's evidence would be that 
during the time frame alleged in Washington County the 
defendant committed sexual acts with a child involving 
touching his genitals to hers and also touching her mouth to 
his genitals. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Bowler, will the defense accept 
that to support this plea? 
MR. BOWLER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Grover, do you agree with your 
attorney? 


























DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Do you understand what I mean by 
that? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Do you still want to plead 
guilty? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: I'll accept your plea then as a knowing 
and voluntary plea and it is entered, and judgment and 
conviction rendered. I'll execute the order approving the 
plea agreement and that be entered in the file. 
Now, Mr. Grover, the rules of procedure give you the 
right to have at least two days before sentencing. As you 
know presentence reports are, as you may know presentence 
reports are often done to give the Court recommendations for 
sentencing. 
First of all, do you want to postpone your 
sentencing for a period of time? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Mr. Bowler, have you 
discussed this with Mr. Grover? 
MR. BOWLER: Yes I have, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Mr. Grover, does that mean 
that you prefer to go ahead with sentencing today? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes, Your Honor. 



























THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Bowler, are there any 
statements you want to make about sentencing? 
MR. BOWLER: Yes, Your Honor. I would, I would 
make the recommendation that anything that the, that the Court 
deems fit to impose in this matter would be done in 
conjunction with treatment programs. I think it's fairly 
obvious that my client has some problems that need to be 
addressed. I personally would like to see him get out on 
probation to address these. I don't believe that's going to 
be a viable possibility for the Court to give him probation at 
this stage but there may be a possibility of having him 
locally in jail and allow him out for treatments. I think 
it's obvious, again, that he needs help. And again, whatever 
the Court decides to impose I would like to see treatment of 
some manner be attached with the sentence. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Grover, do you have any 
statement to make? 
DEFENDANT GROVER: Yes. The treatment thing, and 
it'll, it'll all turn out all right in the end. I trust ^he 
judicial system. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. Mr. Langston? 
MR. LANGSTON: Your Honor, our recommendation would 
be that he be committed as per statute to one to 15 in the 
Utah State Prison. We have no problem at all with the Court 
attaching a recommendation that he receive treatment for his 



























problem as soon as possible, we have no problem with 
recommending credit for time that he has already served. But 
we believe that at this point the only alternative for the 
Court would be to commit him to prison. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Any other comment from the 
defense? 
MR. BOWLER: No, Your Honor. 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
THE JUDGE: All right. With no information other 
than the little bit that I have in this file and in the other 
file, and with the belief that the Department of Corrections 
has the best available treatment programs for this situation, 
the sentence is that Mr. Grover be committed to the Utah State 
Prison for a period not less than one year, not more than 15 
years. 
I do recommend that the Department of Corrections 
consider admitting him to any appropriate treatment program 
they have available as soon as possible. I don't know what 
the situation is or what that would be and I wouldn't presume 
to order something specific beyond that. 
Also, Mr. Grover should be given credit for time 
served in this case. I can't put my hand on the booking 
sheet so I don't know what date that is. But whatever the 
time is should be credited. 
Mr. Grover, you now may have the right to appeal any 



























error of the Court or any issue that has not been waived, and 
to do that you have to file written notice of appeal within 30 
days. 
Good luck to you. 
MR. LANGSTON: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: That can you, counsel. 
MR. BOWLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: That being said then should we handle 
the misdemeanor case? 
MR. LANGSTON: We'd just ask that be dismissed. 
THE JUDGE: All right. The charges in case 050 
or, I'm sorry, 0405 then are dismissed in connection with this 
plea agreement. 
MR. BOWLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
i Criminal No. 971500413 
I Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court on February 6, 2001 pursuant to Defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea. Defendant was present with his counsel, Douglas D. Terry. Plaintiff was 
represented by Ryan W. Shaum. Having heard the testimony of Adult Probation and Parole agent 
Frank Smith, the testimony of Defendant, and the arguments of counsel, the Court took the motion 
under advisement. The Court then assigned its extern to research certain legal issues presented by 
the motion. Having considered all of the information and authorities presented, the Court rules as 
follows: 
FACTS 
On April 15,1997, an Information was filed with this Court in which Defendant was charged 
with rape of a child and sodomy on a child, both first-degree felonies. At Defendant's first 
appearance on April 16, 1997, a public defender was appointed to represent defendant. 
On June 5, 1997, an Amended Information was filed, changing the charges to one count of 
forcible sexual abuse, a second-degree felony, and Defendant appeared in court with counsel to enter 
a plea agreement. At the plea hearing, Defendant was questioned by the Court about his 
understanding of the plea agreement. The written plea agreement was signed and initialed by 
Defendant and, after the plea colloquy was completed, Defendant's guilty plea was accepted and 
entered by the Court. Defendant further waived a pre-sentence investigation and any delay in 
sentencing, and was sentenced to be committed to the Utah State Prison for the time prescribed by 
statute. The Court's Judgment, Sentence, Restitution Judgment, Recommendation, and Commitment 
was entered June 10, 1997. 
On June 18, 1997, Defendant's first public defender filed Defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea, and a "Petition for Determining Competency and Appointment of Alienist/' On July 3, 
1997, the Order Appointing Alienist was signed and entered by the Court. 
On September 23, 1997, Defendant's public defender filed Defendant's "Amended Petition 
for Determining Competency and Appointment of Alienist." On October 7, 1997, a review hearing 
was held, with counsel of record being present but Defendant not present, due to his transportation 
to the Utah State Prison. Although Defendant's attorney spoke of obtaining an alienist's opinion, 
apparently nothing was actually done. 
During the period from the time of Defendant's commitment to the present time, Defendant 
has written numerous letters to the Court. Those letters have all been referred to Defendant's 
attorney for appropriate action. Upon receipt of a letter from Defendant on October 26, 1999, 
however, the Court learned that nothing had been done on Defendant's motion for more than two 
years. The Court then ordered a hearing. Defendant was present at that hearing on November 4, 
1999, and requested that the Court appoint another attorney to represent him. The Court allowed 
Defendant's first attorney to remain in the case, but set another hearing for November 18, 1999 On 
that date, Defendant's first attorney again had nothing to report. The Court found that attorney to 
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have failed to represent Defendant with any acceptable degree of competence and diligence, and 
replaced that attorney with Defendant's current attorney. 
On October 20, 2000, the Court received yet another letter from Defendant concerning his 
case, and ordered another review hearing for November 9, 2000. Thereafter, Defendant's current 
attorney scheduled the Motion to Withdraw Plea for hearing on December 21,2000. Defendant had 
been moved by the Department of Corrections, however, and could not be transported to court for 
that hearing. The hearing was rescheduled for January 4, 2001. 
When the hearing was commenced on January 4, however, Defendant requested that the 
Court replace his second attorney with a third attorney. Defendant was not entirely sure of his 
request, so the Court gave Defendant until January 15 to come to a decision. Defendant's written 
response gave no legitimate reasons for replacing his second attorney, so the Court set the matter 
again for hearing. At a hearing on February 1,2001, the Court found insufficient grounds to change 
the assignment of Defendant's attorney and ordered that the Motion be heard on February 6. 
At the hearing on February 6, 2001, Defendant was present to testify, and also called 
probation agent Frank Martin to testify. The evidence presented included the videotape record of 
Defendant's June 5, 1997 plea hearing. Defendant's attorney was not able to find an expert witness 
who would opine as to Defendant's competence as of the time he entered his guilty plea. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Delay 
Defendant argues that he has been denied due process of law by the extraordinary delay, 44 
months, between the time his motion was filed and the time it was heard. During that entire time, of 
course, Defendant has been incarcerated at various facilities under his commitment to the Department 
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of Corrections. Plaintiff does not argue that 44 months was a reasonable time, but correctly notes 
that the delay is not attributable to Plaintiff in any way. 
The first 29 months of delay are attributable exclusively to the inaction of Defendant's first 
attorney. Some other delays were caused by the difficulties inherent in Defendant's commitment to 
prison and his incarceration at locations quite distant from this court. The final one-month delay was 
caused by Defendant's belated request to replace his current attorney, made at the very hearing at 
which his attorney was prepared to proceed with Defendant's motion; this is the only delay which is 
attributable to Defendant himself, however. 
Neither Defendant's attorney nor the Court's extern was able to locate any precedent for 
Defendant's argument that the delay in the hearing of his motion, or the absence of an alienist's 
report, constitutes a denial of due process of law. The delay and the failure of Defendant's first 
attorney to obtain an alienist's report are inexcusable, but without any controlling precedent to 
support Defendant's argument, without even any comparable precedent, this Court cannot conclude 
that Defendant is entitled to withdraw his motion simply because of that delay and failure. 
Defendant's motion must be considered on its merits. 
2. Good Cause 
UA plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of the 
court." Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2Xa). The burden of proof is upon Defendant to show "good 
cause" for withdrawal of his plea. "Good cause" is not a defined term and is determined on a case-
by-case basis. For example, "good cause" is shown, as a matter of law, where a trial court fails to 
comply strictly with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting the plea. State v 
Smith. 812 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991). Defendant does not allege that the Court failed to strictly 
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comply with Rule 11, and the Court saw no such failure in the videotape of Defendant's plea hearing. 
"Good cause" is also shown if a defendant proves that, at the time he entered his plea, he 
lacked a full knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the plea. State v. Vasilacopulos. 
756 P. 2d 92 (Utah App. 1988). Defendant suggests that his abuse of drugs had caused or contributed 
to serious mental problems which prevented him from understanding the consequences of his plea. 
In support of this suggestion, Defendant refers to the testimony of probation agent Frank Martin, who 
testified that he had dealings with Defendant in 1996, while Defendant was on supervised probation, 
and that Defendant had continued to abuse drugs and was thought by some hospital personnel to have 
methamphetamine psychosis. Mr. Martin could not testify, however, as to any drug use by Defendant 
or as to Defendant's mental condition as of the time Defendant entered his guilty plea. 
Defendant further testified that he had an unusually strong reaction to methamphetamine use, 
but testified that he had not been using methamphetamine in 1997, when he entered his guilty plea. 
Defendant testified that his wife had "dosed" him with "heavy metals" in his cigarettes in early 1997, 
and that he had hallucinations for a couple of years thereafter, but he did not testify that any of this 
was occurring at the plea hearing. As evidence of his alleged confusion about the plea agreement, 
Defendant asserted "I wasn't supposed to go to prison," but fails to explain how he reached such a 
conclusion or why he failed to object to his prison sentence when he was sentenced by this Court. 
All of Defendant's own evidence on this point is entirely subjective and is not corroborated by any 
contemporaneous source. Defendant's testimony is simply too subjective and self-serving to be 
persuasive. 
Finally, this Court had the opportunity to observe Defendant at his plea hearing and again on 
videotape at the hearing of Defendant's motion. On no occasion has this Court observed any 
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indication that Defendant was truly confused, misled, or uninformed about the consequences of his 
guilty plea when he appeared before this Court to enter the plea agreement. To the contrary, 
Defendant was responsive, alert, and entirely lucid when he participated in the plea colloquy with this 
Court on June 5, 1997. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to bear his burden of proof to show any good cause for withdrawal of 
his guilty plea. Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is denied. 
DATED this a*-) day of February, 2001. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
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